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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
James Gerdon appeals from the district court's memorandum opinion dated
September 30, 2011 dismissing his amended successive petition for post convicition
reli8f (R., pp, 311-322), and the district court's judgment of dismissal, filed October 7,
2011 (R., p. 324). Mr. Gerdon asserts that the district court erred by dismissing f·lis
petition for post-conviction relief and by failing to reconsider its dismissal.

8. Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Gerdon had pleaded guilty to sexual abuse of a minor, lewd conduct with a
minor and attempted lewd conduct with a minor on November 10, 4003.

He was

sentenced thereon to a total of fifteen years fixed and fifteen years indeterminate, all
sentences to run concurrently. (R. 312). Mr, Gerdon filed an appeal, but the case was
affirmed on May 19, 2005. (R. 312).
On October 20, 2004, Mr. Gerdon filed his first petition for post-conviction relief.
It was summarily dismissed on June 28, 2006.

(R. 312).

There was apparently

confusion as to when Mr. Gerdon received notice of the dismissal, with Mr. Gerdon
writing to the district judge to inquire regarding the status of his case. The district judge
sent him a copy of the memorandum opinion, and Mr. Gerdon wrote back requesting an
affidavit for purposes of appeal. (R. 318). Mr. Gardon then filed an untimely appeal that
was dismissed due to the untimeliness. (R. 318).
Mr. Gerdon filed his second petition for post-conviction relief claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel during his first post-conviction on April 21, 2008. This petition
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was dismissed on May 6, 2009. (R. 313, 318). Mr. Gerdon appealed, but voluntarily
dimissed his appeal. (R. 313}.
On June 21, 2010, Mr. Gerdon filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief
with, along with a supporting affidavit, alleging ineffective assistance of prior postconviction counsel for failure to assert ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to
file a motion to suppress and failing to object to restitution. (R. 313-314). ·
Throughout Mr. Gerdon's contentions, he maintained that he did not have
effective communication with his attorneys and that therefore he had ineffective
assistance of counsel at the trial stage, appelfate stage, and during his post-convictions.
(See, eg., Tr. pg. 51, Line 1 - pg. 68, Line 7}. Because he was unable to effectively
communicate with his attorneys, and as a result, his arguments were never presented
properly, Mr. Gerdon argued that his successive post-conviction petition should be
allowed. Id.
Ultimately, the District Court denied the motion to reconsider and dismissed the
petition for post-conviction relief in its memorandum decision. {R. 311-322),, and
entered an order dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief. (R. 324).
Mr. Gerdon timely filed his appeal. (R 326~328}.

II. RESTATED ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Did the district court err when it dismissed Mr. Gerdon's Amended
Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief as untimely and as a
successive petition, because the doctrine of equitable tolling should
have applied to allow the Amended Successive Petition?

?

Ill. ARGUMENT
A.
The District Court Erred when it dismissed Mr. Gerdon's Amended Successive Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief as untimely and as a successive petition. because the
doctrine of equitable tolling should have applied to allow the Amended Successive
Petition.

As stated in Appellant's opening brief, a petition for post-conviction relief under the
Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA) is a civil action in nature. Workman v.
State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007). Under Idaho Code§ 19-4903, the

petitioner must prove the claims upon which the petition is based by a preponderance of
the evidence. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802.

A claim for post-conviction relief must be filed within one year from the expiration
of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination
of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever proceeding is later. I.C. § 19-4902.
Successive petitions are impermissible "unless the court finds a ground for relief
asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the
original, supplemental, or amended application. 11 I .C. § 19-4908.

Also as noted in the opening brief, Section 19-4908 sets forth no fixed time within
which successive petitions may be filed, however, the "sufficient reason" tanguage in
the statute necessarily provides "a reasonable time within which such claims [may be]
asserted in a successive post-conviction petition, once those claims are known."
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900,905, 174 P.3d 870, 875 (2007). The determination

of what is a reasonable time is considered by the courts on a case-by-case basis. Id.

An "allegation that a claim was not adequately presented in the first postconviction action due to the ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, if
true, provides sufficient reason for permitting issues that were inadequately presented
to be presented in a subsequent application for post-conviction relief." Baker v. State,
142 Idaho 411,420, 128 P.3d 948,957 {Ct. App. 2005). Further, a petiit?ner asserting

ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel as the "sufficient .reason" for
failing to adequately assert a claim in the original post-conviction action must satisfy a
two-le'lel burden of proof. First, the petitioner must demonstrate that ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel caused the inadequate presentation of a claim in
the first petition. See id. Second, the petitioner must prove the underlying claim that was
inadequately presented and upon which relief is sought. See Workman, 144 Idaho at
522, 164 P.3d at 802.
1. Mr. Gerdon contends that his Petition should have been allowed under I.C. 19-

Mr. Gerdon's contends that the district court erred by failing to allow his petition
under f.C. § 14~4901, and Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, f74 P.3d 870,
874 (2007). Mr. Gerdon argues that he has made a substantial factual showing that his
claim for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt and
cou:d not have, in the exercise of due diligence, been raised earlier, allowing a
successive petition under LC. § 19-4901. He contends that the ineffectiveness of his
attorney at his first post-conviction prevented him from properly presenting his
arguments. Id. Also importantly, Mr. Gerdon has argued that because he did not
receive his legal mail, he was deprived of reasonable access to the c.ou~s such that he
"

A.

was hindered and/or prevented from filing a timely petition, and from properly pursuing it
via his attorneys. See, eg., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996).
An "allegation that a claim was not adequately presented in the first postconviction action due to the ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, if
true, provides sufficient reason for permitting issues that were inadequately presented
to be presented in a subsequent application for post-conviction relief." Baker v. State,
142 Idaho 411,420, 128 P.3d 948, 957 (Ct. App. 2005).
As stated above, throughout Mr. Gerdon's case, he maintained that he did not
L

,,

have effective communication with his attorneys and that therefore

hiJ

had ineffective

assistance of counsel at the trial stage, appellate stage, and during his poc:;t-convictions.
(Tr. pg. 51, Line 1 - pg. 68, Line 7. Tr. pg. 99, Line 13, - pg. 109, Line 24). Particularly,
he did not have effective phone or mail communciation when he was in custody out of
state during his initial appeal period and ·first and second post-convictions and even into
February, 2011 after he filed the post-conviction that is the basis for this appeal. (Tr.
pg. 103, Line 16 - pg. 107, Line 15). Because he was unable to effectively communicate
with his attorneys, and because thereby his arguments were never presented properly,
Mr. Gerdon argued that his successive post-conviction petition should be allowed. Mr.
Gerdon also specifically tendered exhibits into evidence at his evidenti:~_ry hearing that
,•;

demonstrated he had trouble with his legal mail, (Tr. pg. 110, Line 22 - pg. 126, Line 21,
Exhibits 1 - 24), and that as a result, he could not communicate effectively with his
attorneys, and that therefore, his points were not adequately presented af; dlscussed in
Charboneau and Baker. Because they were not adequately presented, including the

claim regarding the failure to file and properly argue the motion to suppress.

Mr.

Gerdort contends that he is not barred by res judicata from pursuing a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel on that issue because his first post-conviction attorney
did not communicate with him, and he was not abfe to properly present the argument.

Further, Mr. Gerdon presented testimony that he did not have access to Idaho
legal authority as he was held out of state, and that for that additional reason, his
arguments were not presented adequately previously. (Tr. pg. 127, Lines 4 ~ 18).
The district court, in denying relief to Mr. Gerdon, noted that "equitable tollingn as
discussed by Charboneau, has been applied only in cases of mental disease and/or
psychotropic medication, or when a petitioner was incarcerated out of state on an instate c;onviction without legal representation or access to Idaho legal materials. (R.
316). Mr. Gerdon has contended that he has submitted evidence of being deprived to
effective access to the courts due to his lack of communication with his attorneys, which
Jed directly to the failure of his first post-conviction attorney to pursue the search warrant
issue, and/or pursue the restitution issue. First, due to being housed out of state, and/or
due to the communication issues he documented, he did not have access to legal
representation in any effective sense. Second, he did not have access to Idaho legal
materials. The record before the district court showed even that there

w~;s no evidence

Mr. Gerdon received notice of the June 28, 2006 decision until after 42 days had
passed. Therefore, Mr. Gerdon's problems with his legal mail cost him the ability to file
a timely appeal. This is one more example of how Mr. Gerdon did not have effective
access to the courts.

It is Mr. Gerdon's position that the problems with communication with the courts

R

and his attorneys caused him to be untimely in filing his appeal from nl~ first postconviction.
Therefore, it is Mr. Gerdon's contention that his third post-conviction petition
should have been allowed, based on the claim of innefective assistance of his prior
post-conviction counsel, and due to that ineffective representation, the conduct of his
trial and appellate counsel.
IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the above, Mr. Gerdon respectfully requests that this Court vacate the
district court's order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.

DATED this

_J_ day of January, 2013.
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